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Abstract 
This paper explores the relationship between domestic retail electricity prices in Great 
Britain and their determinants in the particular context of the New Electricity Trading 
Arrangements (NETA) introduced in 2001. The analysis requires a consistent 
comparison of wholesale power price series before and after NETA, which we 
investigate using a range of wholesale future price series.  Despite its stated intention 
of reducing prices, we conclude that the net effect of NETA alongside other 
developments instead merely rearranged where money was made in the system. 
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Price transmission in the British electricity market: was NETA 
beneficial? 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The purpose of our paper is to explore the relationship between domestic retail 
electricity prices in Great Britain and their various determinants, focussing on the 
effect of the New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA).  In the British electricity 
industry, the mantra “competition where possible, regulation where not” (Littlechild, 
2005) has led to an evolution of processes to inject competition into electricity 
generation and supply, through introducing, encouraging and then reforming markets 
in these areas; the recent series of reforms relating to NETA started in 2001.  These 
arrangements were instituted with the aim of reducing average prices paid to 
generators by suppliers, hence leading to cheaper electricity prices for consumers.  In 
this context, we explore the relationship between domestic retail electricity prices in 
Great Britain and wholesale prices for fuel over the period during which this batch of 
reforms has been instituted.   Ultimately, the test of a change in arrangements must be 
whether the impact on final consumers is positive or not. In this analysis we exploit 
structural differences between the electricity and gas wholesale markets and in 
particular between institutional regimes in England and Wales as against Scotland. 
 
Since the early 1990s, the British electricity market has changed out of all 
recognition.  The first major steps involved vertical disintegration and the introduction 
of competition in generation, together with a Pool mechanism for coordinating 
generation and supply.  This period has been well studied, with key papers on the 
British experience including Green and Newbery (1992) and Wolfram (1998) and, as 
Sweeting (2007) points out, competition in generation has been enhanced in the sense 
that the Herfindahl- Hirschman index in generation has been falling through 
divestiture, although he finds that the generators were nevertheless able to exercise 
considerable market power. 
 
The initial wholesale market arrangement instituted in 1990 employed a power pool, 
where a system marginal price was set for each half hour period of the day by the 
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network operator, based upon matching predicted demand with bids from generators.  
This system received criticism, for example that it was subject to manipulation by 
generators, was insufficiently cost-reflective and that it did not contain demand 
revelation elements (OFGEM, 2002). As a result, replacement arrangements known as 
the New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA) were instituted in March 2001.  
These applied to England and Wales only, whilst Scotland then had a more vertically 
integrated structure.  However, a revision to incorporate the two Scottish operators, 
known as BETTA, was developed and became live in April 2005.  The operating 
scheme under NETA and BETTA involves bilateral wholesale trades together with a 
small balancing market.  It is this little-studied period following the introduction of 
competition in supply and the replacement of the Pool by NETA, which is the focus 
of the present paper.
1
  
 
The major unregulated determinant of retail prices is wholesale electricity costs, 
although clearly there are other costs involved.  Neither generation nor supply is 
regulated in Great Britain and the major operators are active at both these levels, so 
we explore the links between wholesale input prices (gas and coal) into electricity 
generation as well as links between retail and wholesale prices for power.  The 
method by which wholesale and retail prices can be reconciled is by no means 
obvious.  Although the early period of deregulation coincided with generally falling 
retail prices, more recently there have been concerns that the reasons underlying price 
rises are somewhat opaque.  Hence the analysis is not simply a statistical exploration 
with some economic interpretation- deregulatory strategies are being pursued 
worldwide in the electricity industry and there is a live policy interest that has at least 
a European dimension.  Through NETA and BETTA the UK has chosen a particular 
deregulatory path that other countries may choose to follow. 
 
Another important feature of the GB market compared to other large economies is the 
domination of the retail market by integrated players.  The number of firms active in 
residential power supply has now effectively been reduced to six, who together 
                                                 
1
 Evans and Green (2003, 2005) examine some aspects of this question, but do not consider the impact 
on retail consumers at all. Federico and Rahman (2003) engage in some theoretical examination of the 
likely impact, but the results are not particularly clear cut. 
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control over 99% of domestic consumer supply.
2
  Each of these competes in the 14 
regions of the electricity industry. They are British Gas, E.On (formerly Powergen), 
npower (RWE), EdF, Scottish Power (Iberdrola) and Scottish and Southern.   
 
The third important feature to note is that each company is to a significant, and 
growing, extent vertically integrated across both generation and supply, principally in 
gas and coal fired production.
3
  The major sources of input fuels for power generation 
in the UK are gas, coal and nuclear energy.   E.On and npower are the descendents of 
the old coal generating companies, British Gas is obviously the owner of a major 
input (and operates several power stations), EdF is a supplier to the market through 
the interconnector with France and its own power stations, and early in 2009 took 
over British Energy, the formerly independent generator based on a fleet of nuclear 
power stations. In addition the two Scottish firms have both retained a generation 
wing.    The drive to vertically integrate back into generation started around 1998 and 
has continued for several years. In addition to the vertically integrated firms, there are 
non-integrated generators, including Drax and International Power. Certain of the 
supply companies have interests in electricity distribution as well, but these activities 
are subject to separation and regulatory arrangements and can be viewed as separate.  
 
At the same time, the experiment of introducing NETA cannot be considered as 
“clean”.4  Since one of the main tasks of suppliers in the market is, in effect, to absorb 
risk, the drive towards vertical integration across generation and supply and a 
simultaneous squeeze of independent supply companies may well in part have been a 
result of the NETA arrangements, or indeed the knowledge that NETA was to happen.  
Moreover, the process of deregulating competition in supply was still under way in 
the relevant period.  At the wholesale level we tackle this range of effects through a 
form of difference-in-differences analysis looking before and after NETA‟s 
introduction.  The controls are (i) the situation in Scotland, where unlike England and 
Wales, an unchanging wholesale regime was in operation until 2005, spanning the 
                                                 
2
 We do not examine the industrial power market, where retail as well as wholesale prices are 
negotiated so that we do not have access to retail price series.  Nor do we consider Northern Ireland. 
3
 Of course, in many other countries there have been trends towards vertical reintegration (Meade and 
O‟Connor, 2009). 
4
 On a methodological note, empirical investigations have at least two desirable criteria- the importance 
of the phenomenon and the cleanness of the setting.  Our question is stronger in respect of the former 
than the latter. 
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introduction of NETA, and (ii) the wholesale market in gas, which had an unchanging 
regulatory structure over our entire period.  In addition, at the retail level we are able 
to distinguish between effects on customers of non-incumbents (an unregulated 
market) versus those of incumbents. 
 
Our analysis is very different in focus from the existing literature in many respects.  
First, the period- our focus is the period of transition between Pool and NETA during 
which competition in supply was operative.  Second, unlike Bushnell et al, we do not 
attempt to assess the impact of vertical integration, by itself, on wholesale prices.  
Wholesale prices might be an appropriate focus if the supply activity was regulated 
but in the UK (since 1999 in large part, since 2002 in total) it is not.
5
 We are 
interested in retail prices and their determinants.  Since 1999 retail consumers have all 
been free to choose their supplier and large numbers have switched.  However, until 
2001 the tariffs of incumbent suppliers were regulated (at prices generally in excess of 
entrant offers), at which point incumbent direct debit customers‟ tariffs were freed 
from regulation.  Since 2002, all regulation of domestic consumer tariffs has been 
removed.  
 
Because vertical integration arose over the same time period as NETA was being 
discussed and implemented, there are clear difficulties in disentangling the separate 
effects.  However, what we can certainly do is examine whether, in the period over 
which competition in supply has been in place, the combined impact of NETA and 
vertical integration has been beneficial on average or not, to final consumers, and our 
regression analysis does speak to the individual effects.  NETA (and also BETTA 
subsequently) was “sold” by the regulator on the basis that it would improve the 
operation of the wholesale market and, less obviously, that the market as a whole 
would be more competitive.  Was it the hoped-for success? 
 
We examine this by making comparison between the (relevant dates within the) two 
years 1999-2001 in which there was competition in supply (for all non-incumbent 
customers) but there was a wholesale pool and the period of four years 2001-2005 in 
which NETA operated, but the picture in Scotland remained unchanged.  Extending 
                                                 
5
 The UK is not of course unique in this respect.  See for example Gans and Wolak‟s (2008) analysis of 
a substantial part of the Australian market which also has unregulated retail prices (but retains a pool). 
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this to the period after BETTA was introduced would be somewhat more problematic, 
although terminating in 2005 misses out very significant price hikes.  One reason is 
that there is then no clear end-point, and the empirical pattern of retail and wholesale 
prices suggests that choosing an end point may have a significant influence on the 
results.
6
  A second reason is that, over time but particularly since 2005, a much 
greater range of retail tariff arrangements has been in place, so that using the standard 
retail data series is less representative, in particular, of prices the marginal switching 
consumer will face.  
 
To preview findings, it is clear that NETA succeeded in its primary aim, of reducing 
margins at the wholesale level, i.e. generation margins.  However this did not lead to 
lower retail prices.  Indeed, whilst wholesale margins fell significantly, retail margins 
rose, we suggest as a side-effect of the introduction of NETA and the forces this 
unleashed.  As a result, the overall impact of market restructuring seems to have been 
no reduction in retail prices compared with underlying costs, if anything the opposite.  
As we say in the conclusion, the policy implications are potentially very significant. 
 
In this paper, after describing the data sources in section 2, we consider an appropriate 
theoretical framework for the analysis (section 3), outline our empirical strategy 
(section 4), analyse margins at various levels using various cuts of the data (section 5) 
and then conclude (section 6).  A few more technical aspects of the relationships 
between various wholesale costs are relegated to the Appendix.  
 
2. Data sources 
 
We have access to four major data sources that facilitate this analysis.  First, we have 
a set of time series for domestic retail prices for electricity, collected as current prices 
from the relevant website (most recently, energywatch, the consumer watchdog 
disbanded in 2008).  For present purposes, we have these data for the period April 
1999 to March 2007 inclusive; the data have been collected bi-monthly for the three 
major bill types across three levels of consumption and the fourteen regions across 
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 Margins exhibit significantly more variance after 2005, meaning that an artificial (rather than logical) 
endpoint carries a danger that results are somewhat dependent on endpoint 
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which prices differ.
7
 Second, we have a set of proprietary wholesale data for the 
period from April 1999 or April 2001 (dependent on series) to March 2007 supplied 
by Platts, one of the three major energy data information companies. This comprises 
time series on short-dated forward prices for power, natural gas, gas oil, heavy fuel 
oil, and coal. The power (electricity) price data is at daily frequency (7-day), whilst 
the gas, gas oil and heavy fuel oil (hereafter “fuel”) prices were on a working day 
basis
8
 and coal appears to be priced weekly (commonly observed on a Monday).  
Alongside this short-dated data, we also have Platts‟ assessments for week, month, 2-
seasons and year –ahead future delivery, for both electricity and gas. Third, in 
addition we have a series of day averages of spot market settlement prices for 
baseload power from the UK Power Exchange (UKPX) covering the period from 
February 1999 to April 2007 (published initially by the Pool as system marginal 
prices, now by Spectron).  Finally, we have distribution costs data for each of the 14 
regions (from BERR, formerly DTI, and from April 2006 from the Energy Networks 
Association) over the entire period, also what limited information is published on 
suppliers‟ market shares, at the national level for all companies and at the regional 
level for incumbents (from OFGEM, the regulator), plus some additional institutional 
information.  
 
3. Theoretical framework for analysis 
 
Our ultimate aims are to examine the behaviour of the whole margin between retail 
electricity prices and underlying wholesale prices and to make margin comparisons 
between the market situation post supply competition but prior to NETA with the 
situation post NETA.  Because of the manifold changes taking place in the market, we 
decide against employing a structural approach to modelling in favour of a difference-
in-differences method.  A further clear difficulty is that the Pool system involved a 
single market price whereas the NETA system has no such price, the settlement 
market being a very small proportion of the total transacted.  Indeed once NETA was 
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 Distribution costs differ across regions. This means suppliers can, and do, differentiate supply prices 
across regions to various extents.  It should be noted that in the very recent past it has become more 
common for consumers to be offered “special deals” (such dual fuel deals, internet only tariffs, capped 
price contracts) via company websites; certain of these retail prices are not available via our data 
source. 
8
 There was a slight difference between the included working days between gas and the other two 
series.   
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introduced, supply companies essentially had two tasks to complete.  First they need 
to realise margins between wholesale and retail price (without these of course, they 
have no business model).  Second, they need to engage in risk management since 
retail prices are fixed for a substantially longer period than are wholesale prices and 
wholesale prices are subject to significant volatility.   We analyse these as two 
separate issues.  
 
Risk management 
Figure 1 panel (a) shows the time path of base-load month-ahead electricity wholesale 
prices from 2001 onwards.  Panel (b) shows the time path of the corresponding 
average retail supply price (annual bill for medium consumption in pence), facing 
domestic consumers.
9
  Clearly, wholesale prices are very significantly more volatile 
than retail prices.  Moreover, it is not technically possible to pass on the volatility in 
wholesale prices to retail consumers, even if they would be willing to bear it, because 
current meter technology in domestic supply does not allow it.  Therefore, unless a 
supply company‟s appetite for risk is considerable, it will wish to engage in risk 
reduction through a portfolio purchase strategy.  In response to this demand, markets 
for contracts of various lengths have developed.  In addition to a small spot market, 
there are day-ahead, month-ahead, year ahead and various other contracts available, 
including the possibility of long term purchase.  Another risk-reducing strategy, of 
course, is to produce on own-account, on the plausible assumption (examined below) 
that the costs of this are less volatile than purchase.   
 
Given the range of forward prices on offer, it is unclear which should be viewed as 
“the” price.  However, under certain circumstances the choice is immaterial.  
Specifically, consider the calendar spread 
,
T T
T t tS p p                                                                                                 (1)    
where Tp is the price at time  for delivery of a unit of electricity at time T and θ 
measures the distance between two time periods.  If this series ,TS   is stationary then 
on average it does not matter whether a purchaser buys the shorter or the longer dated 
                                                 
9
 In our empirical work we use retail prices averaged across region, company and bill size.  This 
averaging is not the cause of the lesser volatility in retail prices, which tend to very similar movements 
across regions (the pairwise correlation coefficients always being in excess of 0.98). 
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contract, it gives rise to the same expected price. In this case, a company may 
nevertheless choose to diversify risk by purchasing forward, thereby reducing 
variance.
10
  
 
Achievement of margins 
We now abstract entirely from the risk aspects discussed above and consider the 
situation where there are a set I of integrated generator/ suppliers, plus a set U of 
unintegrated generators.   Integrated suppliers can contract ahead their retail 
commitments.  Thus they face a two-stage game, in stage 1 they make their retail 
commitments (in practice, this means they sign up a number of retail customers, 
whose consumption is rather inelastic with respect to price), in stage 2 they make 
production commitments.  This means that in determining the optimum for stage 2, 
stage 1‟s decisions can be considered fixed.  This basic setup derives from Bushnell, 
Mansur and Saravia (2008); we also adopt their assumption of Cournot behaviour at 
both stages (which may be thought of as precommitment to quantity, with price 
setting to clear the market).  Implicitly, we are also assuming that consumers make 
rational choices of supplier in aggregate.  We suppose for simplicity that there are no 
costs in the system apart from production costs (we assume, amongst other things, 
that transmission and distribution costs are given and regulated); hence by assumption 
no additional marginal costs arise at retail level.   
 
Profit for a typical partially integrated firm, indexed i, in period t can be written: 
, , , , , , , , , , , , , ,( , , ) ( , , )[ ] ( , ) ( )
w r r r r r
it i t i t u t t i t i t u t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i tq q Q p q q Q q q p q q q C q           
(2) 
 
Here q (Q) represents firm (group) quantities, with p‟s being prices,  profits and C 
total costs, the superscript r distinguishing retail magnitudes where relevant.
11
  
Solving stage 2, retail commitments have already been made, so 
                                                 
10
 Note that this has nothing necessarily to do with liquidity in the forward markets.  If the forward 
markets are very liquid, arbitrage will make the result true (up to the level of transactions costs), since 
speculators would otherwise profit from buying and selling different matching lengths of contracts.  
However, the converse, that if a market is illiquid, the result will not hold, is not necessary, although it 
could occur.  This is relevant because there have been claims that the markets in question are relatively 
illiquid. 
11
 A special degenerate case exists where qi,t = 0.  This allows the possibility of unintegrated retail 
suppliers. 
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, '
, , , , , , ,
, ,
( , , ) [ ] ( ) 0
w
i t w r t
t i t i t u t i t i t i t i t
i t i t
p
p q q Q q q C q
q q


 
    
 
                                  (3) 
 
Similarly, for an unintegrated firm (which earns profit  only at the production 
stage), the production commitments stage can be written 
 
, '
, , , , , ,
, ,
( , , ) ( ) 0
w
u t w t
t u t u t I t u t u t u t
u t u t
p
p q q Q q C q
q q

 
   
 
                                       (4) 
 
Notice that here we have allowed for production costs to differ as between integrated 
and unintegrated firms, but not within those groups, although this would be possible. 
 
At the retail (first, but analysed second) stage, the integrated firms have the following 
first order condition: 
 
, ,
, ,
, ,
0
r
i t i tw r r
t i t i tr r
i t i t
p
p p q
q q
 
    
 
                                                                       (5) 
 
We can now analyse various scenarios.  Scenario 0 has a Pool and no integrated firms.  
With separate retail and wholesale firms, double marginalisation exists as given by 
equations (4) and (5).  Consider next scenario 1 in which there are no unintegrated 
firms, so equations (3) and (5) are relevant.  All the integrated firms are identical in 
size, as a result of the assumption regarding costs and the fact that electricity is 
homogeneous.  All can pre- commit up to 100% of their output to their own retail 
customers; alternatively, there may be an active spot market for power (perhaps in a 
model where there are supply risks and generation plant on occasion fails).  Suppose 
they do pre-commit 100%.  Then equation (3) tells us that wholesale price falls to 
marginal cost.  Replacing that in equation (5) and simplifying, employing the Cournot 
assumption regarding other players‟ reactions, shows that the retail price-cost margin 
is given by the traditional Cournot formula: 
'
, ,
,
(.) 1
r
i t i t
r
i t I r
p C
p N 

                                                                                     (6) 
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where NI is the number of integrated firms andr is the retail elasticity of demand for 
electricity.  All retail prices will also be identical.  In other words, as Bushnell et al. 
emphasise, the wholesale price is low as a result of integration but, something they do 
not consider, in our model the integrated firms make their profit at the retail level, 
having transferred power downstream at marginal cost.
12
 
 
Scenario 2 is where integrated and unintegrated generators co-exist.  This implies 
equations (3) and (4) both hold true upstream.  However, unless integrated firms‟ 
commitments to the downstream market are substantially below 100%, the cost levels 
of these two types of firms must be very different.  Essentially, integrated firms will 
want to set wholesale price at less than their marginal cost where their commitments 
exceed their production, so unintegrated firms will produce at a loss unless their 
marginal costs are lower than those of integrated firms.
13
  Retail prices will continue 
to be governed by a formula like (6), except that the marginal cost will need to 
appropriately re-interpreted as the average marginal cost an integrated firm faces, 
taking its relatively higher marginal cost together with unintegrated firms‟ lower 
marginal costs.   
 
All other things equal, final retail prices may be expected to be lower in scenarios 1 
and 2 than in scenario 0, as a result of the precommitments made to final consumers 
by the integrated firms.  A particularly advantageous scenario from consumers‟ point 
of view is if the retail margin exhibited in (6) is constrained by regulation, by entry, or 
other controls. However, an alternative position is that the retail margin expands in 
scenarios 1 and 2 because vertical integration amongst suppliers, together with the 
absence of a Pool, makes entry at the level of supply only more difficult, so that the 
existing suppliers find less market pressure on the prices they set.  Then, when retail 
regulation is removed, there is scope to raise retail margins. Certainly in Britain 
entrant independent suppliers have, after a time, all collapsed.  At around the same 
time as the Pool was being exchanged for NETA, significant vertical integration was 
taking place in the electricity market and the last significant independent supplier 
(Independent Energy) left the market.  It is unlikely these events were unconnected.   
                                                 
12
 Clearly, this is sensitive to our assumption (and the UK reality) that there is no retail price regulation. 
13
 Notice that a nuclear generator or a particularly efficient conventional power station is likely to have 
lower than average marginal costs so may find it worthwhile to operate un-integrated. 
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Let us summarise predictions.  Under the assumptions favourable to the reform, 
wholesale margins decrease a good deal between first and second period, whereas 
retail margins are static.  Therefore, overall margins fall.  Under the alternative more 
pessimistic assumption, whereas the wholesale margins decrease, the retail margin 
increases due to increased barriers to entry and insufficient competitive/ regulatory 
pressure at retail level. In consequence, the overall impact is uncertain. 
 
4. Empirical Strategy 
 
Clearly, in testing the implications of the modelling of section 3 we require a baseline.  
The problem is twofold and relates to the facts (a) that prices for wholesale electricity 
and its inputs vary all the time and (b) many institutional changes were adopted in the 
market at quite similar times.  First, we need to consider the issue of risk 
management, and whether there are wholesale prices in the market before NETA 
which can correspond to prices in the market after NETA.  Second, we need some 
form of control for outside events in the retail market, and an overall view on 
margins.  Here, our approach is to make use of two rather clear controls available to 
us, namely the institutional settings of the wholesale gas market and of the Scottish 
electricity market at wholesale and retail, and to measure the impact of the changes in 
the England and Wales electricity market with respect to these controls.   
 
On the first point, we develop the ideas represented by equation 1.  Given the range of 
forward prices on offer, it is theoretically unclear which should be viewed as “the” 
price.  Indeed, supply companies commonly make claims such as that retail prices 
cannot drop when wholesale prices drop, because the company has purchased ahead 
at higher prices.  Under this argument, rehearsed for example in OFGEM (2007), it is 
quite possible for wholesale and retail prices to move in different directions and to 
bear little relationship to one another. This apparent lack of a relationship is 
something we demonstrate in the Appendix, using information on returns. 
 
In examining calendar spreads, we use the prices (assessments) available from Platts 
at day-ahead, week-ahead, month-ahead, two seasons ahead and year-ahead.  In 
addition we have UKPX power exchange prices.  Our present main aim is to test the 
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stationarity of these spreads within our period 2001-2007.  If the futures markets are 
efficient and liquid, then arbitrage implies the spreads will be stationary, since 
otherwise traders can make gains by selling one maturity and buying another if the 
prices are further apart than available information would suggest is reasonable.
14
 
However, since it is commonly claimed that the markets are not liquid, divergences 
from stationarity are possible. 
 
To investigate these issues, we perform Dickey-Fuller tests for stationarity.  Some 
results of these are presented in table 1 and an illustrative graph of a calendar spread 
is shown in figure 2.  The results presented in table 1a illustrate links between day-
ahead prices and other maturities on which we have data, for the period 2001-2007; 
we also examined all other combinations of maturities. Essentially, this series of 
results illustrated by table 1a tell a consistent story- the spreads are stationary in 
almost every case, meaning that any one series does not, on average, carry different 
information from any other.   
 
There is a further, extremely important, implication, illustrated in table 1b.  The 
spreads involving the UKPX data and all available maturities of Platts prices show 
that these spreads are also stationary, in every case.  This means that in expectational 
terms, it does not matter whether a supplier chooses to purchase a future contract 
some time before delivery, or to purchase very close to delivery.  Sometimes, one will 
turn out ex post as the better strategy, sometimes the other.  The importance lies in the 
fact that when the Pool was in operation, UKPX prices were available but the various 
maturities of wholesale prices making up the Platts indices were not.  If there was no 
relationship between the UKPX prices and the Platts prices, we could not make 
comparisons before and after NETA, because of the difference in the underlying 
wholesale markets.  The stationarity result reported in table 1b implies that we can 
make comparisons in expectational terms between the market situations before and 
after NETA. 
 
Although the various series are stationary, risk management is still important.  In 
addition, stationarity does not imply that the mean prices are equal.  In table 2 we 
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 In other words, in the absence of market-affecting news coming between the timing of one security 
and the other, the prices should be equal (barring any interest premium). 
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estimate the mean differences, using the relative wholesale spread [(ukpx – 
„future‟)/ukpx]15 .  The table shows that on a mean-value test near maturities are at a 
discount of just over 3% to UKPX, with the longer-dated ones at a greater discount.
16
  
Using medians, and the Wilcoxon test, a similar pattern (but slightly smaller discounts 
overall) is presented. 
 
We now turn to the logic relating to the controls.  One of these is the wholesale 
market for gas.  The gas market has a quite different national institutional structure.  
Gas is a very significant input into electricity generation (approximately 37% of 
electricity is produced from gas in the UK, the largest proportion of any fuel).
17
  The 
wholesale market for gas has not, over the period we are interested in (since 1999), 
been the subject of any major policy interventions, and gas was privatised and 
deregulated significantly before electricity.  Thus we take as an index for wholesale 
costs of one MWh of electricity, the cost of that amount of gas which will produce 
one MWh of electricity.  The standard approach we adopt is to use the so-called 
“spark spread”, the gap between the wholesale cost of electricity and the gas cost to 
produce it; this concept is standard in the industry as a measure of the potential 
profitability of electricity generation.  We use gas, rather than coal (i.e. the “dark 
spread”) because coal is markedly more storable so that the price at any time does not 
fully reflect present conditions.  Moreover, as demonstrated in the Appendix, whilst 
prices in the wholesale gas market and wholesale electricity market appear to be 
somewhat related, no demonstrable link exists between wholesale electricity and coal 
(or oil) prices.   
 
Finally, on the retail side, the Scottish market has a very useful feature.  It remained a 
separate vertically integrated market until the BETTA reforms of 2005 (in addition 
the transmission interconnector between England and Scotland has limited capacity 
and the penetration of English retailers into the Scottish market is relatively limited).  
Hence as between the 1999-2001 period and the 2001-05 period, significant changes 
were taking place in the England and Wales wholesale market but not in the Scottish 
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 Here „future‟ means one of the Platt‟s future prices. 
16
 Supply is extremely inelastic in the short run, less inelastic in the longer run, so this is what we 
should expect. 
17
 The figures (from the Digest of Energy Statistics, 2007) are done on an “electricity supplied” or 
output basis. 
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wholesale market.  Therefore, we can use the Scottish market as a control, to take 
account of factors that could influence the overall picture which we may have 
omitted.  There is also a comparison available between retail price trends relating to 
the unregulated non-incumbent versus partly-regulated incumbent supplier tariffs.  
 
5. Margins Analysis 
 
Let us take as given the above results on calendar spreads on different wholesale 
maturities, and on spark spreads. Our tests of the effects of changes in the market 
institutions then boil down to a set of simple pairwise comparisons.  Do mean 
margins, of various types, rise or fall as between the pre-NETA (1999-2001) and post-
NETA, pre-BETTA (2001-2005) stages?   
 
 
Generation Margins 
To examine trends in generation margins before and after the introduction of NETA, 
we first require a common wholesale price, before and after NETA.  Here, the results 
of the previous section suggest that in expectational terms, the UKPX series is 
representative (albeit on the high side) of prices available in the market following 
NETA, and at the same time is appropriate in the pre-NETA or Pool stage.  The other 
factor required is an appropriate input price.  Here we choose to use the (day-ahead) 
gas price, for reasons discussed above.   
 
Our chosen measure of the generation margin is the “spark spread”, being the 
difference between the wholesale price of electricity, as defined earlier, and the cost 
of producing that electricity, using gas.
18
  We engage in a straightforward comparison 
of mean relative spark spread [spark spread/electricity price] before and after the point 
when NETA was introduced.  The results are very clear-cut, in line with the 
prediction, and very striking, as can be seen from table 3.  The spark spread is 
markedly lower in the later period, on average (a 24% markup as against a 44% 
markup).  Thus, the profitability of merchant generators will have suffered, and 
                                                 
18
 Here we make the standard assumption about average efficiency of gas generation plant.  Because 
we end this analysis in early 2005, we are not concerned with the “green” spark spread. 
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investment plans for new independent generation plant will have been subject to 
considerable downward impact.
19
  
 
Retail Margins 
Turning now to retail margins, we utilise a new measure that we call the relative 
“Retail margin spread”.  We define this as [(retail “price” – wholesale price – 
distribution cost)/retail “price”].  Retail price is the average bill across the companies 
for a consumer taking an average amount of electricity (3,300kWh per year).  
Wholesale price is the UKPX figure discussed earlier, for the same quantity. 
Distribution cost varies by area as well as time.  We split up into different types (e.g. 
areas) somewhat, as described later.  Note that we have not included a factor for 
transmission costs, which are a rather small part of the bill (but also very complex).  
Apart from this omission, the idea is to subtract from retail price the disbursements 
the retailer must make.  Other costs, for example marketing, billing, metering, etc are 
somewhat subject to the supplier‟s discretion. 
 
The results of this exercise are shown in table 4.  This makes comparison of means 
between the period in 1999-2001, after retail competition had been instituted but 
before NETA, and the period in 2001-2005 after NETA but before BETTA.  The idea 
is that whilst Scotland has experienced the same changes on the retail side of the 
market, it is essentially unaffected by structural reorganisation at wholesale level over 
this period.  Hence it can act as a point of reference.  Moreover, consumers in 
Scotland who are not with their incumbent supplier have no first order impacts on 
them coming from either supply or wholesale level across the two periods.
20
 
 
A further point of comparison (either in England and Wales or in Scotland) is between 
two groups of direct debit customers- those who are with their incumbent supplier and 
those with an alternative provider, since in the first period prices are regulated for the 
former, whereas in the later period they are regulated for neither group. The same 
comparison is also carried out for prepayment meter users, customers that are 
                                                 
19
 There is substantial evidence consistent with this- restructuring at British Energy in 2002, following 
an approach to the DTI resulting from an inability to meet its liabilities (HC892, July 2007) and at Drax 
in 2003 (Company website), for example. 
20
 There may be second-order impacts, because non-incumbent suppliers are likely to base their offer 
partly on what the incumbent is charging. 
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generally charged higher tariffs than other categories of customers (partly due to the 
cost of servicing the meters) and who are usually not courted as actively by non 
incumbent suppliers. Table 4a takes a further segmentation of the market.  It shows 
the results of the same comparisons carried out between the period before the 
introduction of NETA and the period after April 2002, when retail price controls were 
removed for all payment methods and most of the consolidation process amongst 
suppliers had been completed. 
 
Several things stand out from table 4.  First, there has been a general drift upward in 
retail margins as between the two periods.  This might be seen as essentially a 
premium for risk- companies all engage in forward buying to reduce risk and, as we 
have seen, this comes at a premium.  Or there may be non-discretionary cost factor 
impacts that we do not include in our margin.
21
 We note that, for the Scottish direct 
debit non-incumbent customers, this margin rises approximately 5.6%.  However, 
comparing with the Scottish incumbent customers, we see their margin increased by 
around 10%. More strikingly, the relative retail spreads for prepayment meter users 
served by non incumbents in Scotland are not statistically different between the two 
periods, while for those served by the incumbents we observe a significant increase of 
around 9% between the two periods.  This difference is indicative of a rise resulting 
from relaxed regulation of incumbent prices at supply level.  Whether that relaxation 
of retail regulation (which many observers consider desirable) is later followed by 
more competitive pricing so that increases in margins for this reason are short-lived, is 
something we do not examine here.   
 
The difference in difference analysis in the final column shows clearly that retail 
margins have increased by significantly more in the case of England and Wales, 
where NETA was introduced.  Since the only real difference between countries is the 
introduction of NETA, the strong suggestion is that NETA has had a strong impact on 
the rise in margins. Here, non-incumbent direct debit customers see their margin go 
up by 11.3%, whereas for incumbent customers the rise is 16.3%!  As with the impact 
on wholesale margins, the effects are clear and quite dramatic.  The impact of NETA 
on top of retail relaxation has allowed a greater increase in retail margins in England 
                                                 
21
 These exclude carbon costs, which were not instituted until 2005, but there are certain other factors 
that appear to have increased in later years of our sample (Cornwall, 2008). 
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and Wales than in Scotland. In sum, a combination of NETA, vertical integration and 
regulatory relaxation has allowed retail margins to drift up a good deal, and each of 
these appears to have had some impact.  As shown in Table 4a, the results are 
qualitatively very similar when for robustness purposes we compare margin spreads 
in the period before the introduction of NETA and the period after April 2002. 
 
However, this analysis of differences between means does not explain precisely why 
retail margins increased.  Amongst the possible explanations are the increased vertical 
integration leading to a lack of transparency over wholesale prices, a lack of liquidity 
in the wholesale market, and the impact of these factors upon independent supply 
companies.  Independent suppliers may act as a constraint upon the markups that the 
established major operators can obtain, either by attracting consumers or acting as 
basing points for established suppliers‟ prices.  In order to investigate this issue 
somewhat further, we regress retail prices on their various potential determinants, 
including dummies taking the value 1 when the particular independent is in operation.   
 
The results of our estimation along these lines are shown in table 5.  These relate 
retail price (annual bill, pence for a medium consumer taking 3300kWh) to 
distribution cost (for the same consumer, in pence), wholesale price in pence (again in 
pence for a medium consumer, instrumented by Brent crude oil price, lagged 6 
months), a dummy for the presence of NETA, a broad measure of the degree of 
vertical integration amongst the big-6 suppliers, instrumented by the 20-year bond 
yield, and dummies for the presence, as independent entities, of those independents 
which captured around 100,000 customers or more. We show results both for England 
and Wales, and somewhat truncated, for Scotland, where NETA and vertical 
integration were at that stage irrelevant.   
 
The main results from England and Wales are that wholesale price appears to have 
some impact, in that an increase in wholesale price is passed on in the order of 1/3 to 
½ to the retail price. The impact of distribution cost (which varies substantially less), 
is somewhat puzzling but probably relates to the variable picking up trends in the 
data.  Both NETA and vertical integration appear to have had a positive impact on 
retail price, given wholesale cost.  This is suggested already by our previous results. 
In terms of magnitudes, a coefficient of 1000 implies an increase in the annual bill of 
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£10, ceteris paribus.  It is worth noting in addition that the effect on non-incumbent 
PPM customers seems to have been somewhat different. There is also significant 
evidence that the independent suppliers on average had a substantial moderating 
influence (several pounds on the average annual bill)- whilst individual coefficients 
differ substantially in magnitude and significance, in the case of each subgroup the 
Wald test implies that there is a significant overall impact.  It is also interesting to 
make comparisons as between incumbent and non-incumbent firm customers.  For 
prepayment customers, non-incumbent customers are less affected by NETA.  
 
For Scotland, as we would predict, the only significant factors relate to the non-
incumbents‟ and independents‟ pricing.  Thus the regression results concord with but 
nuance the simple comparison of means analysis.  It does appear that NETA was a 
catalyst in margins at retail level rising in England and Wales. 
 
Yet, against this conclusion, supply divisions of the “big six” have made claims they 
earn no money on retail activity.  To reconcile these points, note that we are not 
taking into account the actual transfer price between divisions of an integrated firm. 
Nor are we including any of the costs in any way under the company‟s own 
discretion.  Whilst some of these are only slightly in the control of suppliers, others 
such as marketing expenses clearly have more of a discretionary flavour.  The second 
factor is that, in setting retail prices, a supplier will have regard to more than just its 
costs.  Prime amongst these other factors, along with a desire to smooth price 
fluctuations to domestic customers to a great extent, will be the competitive position 
in relation to other suppliers.   
 
Arguably though, the relationship between wholesale electricity prices and retail 
prices for electricity is not something of great public concern if at the same time the 
wholesale margin with respect to generation costs has fallen, on the assumption that 
the result is lower retail prices.  Therefore to obtain an overall perspective, it is 
important to look also at the impact of the various changes on retail prices relative to 
the underlying costs of wholesale gas. 
 
This can be analysed by considering the whole margin [(retail prices of electricity - 
wholesale prices of gas - electricity distribution costs)/retail price of electricity].  
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Table 6 displays these results on an aggregate basis.  The disappointing truth, for 
England and Wales, is that the overall margins in the first and second period are too 
close for the difference to be significant, while we do observe a significant decline in 
overall margins for Scotland.  The most straightforward interpretation of this finding 
is that the impact of NETA in England and Wales was a reorganisation of where 
money was made in the system, rather than having any benefit for consumers overall. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
 
The direct link between wholesale and retail prices in UK domestic electricity supply 
is, so far as we can ascertain, not strong.  Over time, wide divergences between the 
trends of these two variables have been observed, so that margins have changed a 
good deal.  It has been argued that this is plausibly related to forward purchasing 
behaviour rather than, as has also been suggested, a desire to make money at 
consumers‟ expense.  We question this sanguine view. The effects of forward 
purchasing are apparent in the strong time persistence noted in the data.  On the other 
hand, the accounting analysis of Cornwall et al. (2008) is more consistent with our 
finding of rather weak links between wholesale and retail prices, and a substantial 
impact relating to stronger retail positions post-NETA. Cornwall et al observe big 
changes in supplier profitability over time.   
 
In policy terms, our results point to a major problem.  Supply companies blame rises 
in retail prices on rising wholesale prices.  The problem is that the longer-dated 
market (in excess of one year), which is a very significant part of the trade, is opaque, 
since all prices are negotiated through bilateral bargains which are not observed by 
the major market information providers.  Indeed, a significant proportion of such 
prices will never be observed, since they are between one arm of the company and 
another, its generation arm!  Thus liquidity is limited.  At times when retail prices rise 
strongly this leads to considerable concern amongst consumers and their 
representatives.  It also brings into context the move from a pool price system to 
NETA.  This was planned to lead to an improvement in the competitiveness of the 
market, albeit at the cost of additional trading costs incurred by market participants.  
Instead, it appears to have resulted in a tradeoff for society between benefits at 
generation level from vertical integration and costs of increased retail margins.  The 
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opacity it created and the attendant consequences for the retail market seem not to 
have been foreshadowed.   
 
Substantial price rises for consumers have significant distributional impacts in terms 
of increasing the number of “fuel poor” households in society.  Yet it could be argued 
that the main concern in electricity markets such as this is no longer prices facing 
consumers, but achieving sustainable generation and consumption patterns.  
Nevertheless on this point our analysis of generation and retail margins suggests that 
the current system provides very weak incentives for non-integrated generators to add 
to their stock of plant, something which may be storing up problems for the future.  
This affects both plant replacement decisions of existing large-scale independent 
generation plant and smaller-scale investment opportunities for alternative fuels. 
 22 
References 
Bushnell, J.,  Mansur, E. and C. Saravia. "Vertical Arrangements, Market Structure 
and Competition: An analysis of Restructured U.S. Electricity Markets." American 
Economic Review. Vol. 98, No. 1. March 2008.  
Cornwallenergy Associates for the National Right to Fuel Campaign (2008) Gas and 
Electricity Costs to Consumers, Unison 
 
Evans, J. and Green, R. (2003) “Why did British electricity prices fall after 1998?”, 
Hull University Business School, Research Memorandum 35. 
 
Evans, J. and Green, R. (2005), “Why did British electricity prices fall after 1998?”, 
Mimeo, University of Birmingham, July. 
 
Federico, G. & Rahman, D. (2003), "Bidding in an electricity pay-as-bid auction," 
Journal of Regulatory Economics, 24(2), 175-211. 
 
Gans, J S and Wolak, F A (2008) “A comparison of ex ante versus ex post vertical 
market power: evidence from the electricity supply industry”, mimeo, University of 
Melbourne. 
 
Green, R J and Newbery, D M (1992) “Competition in the British electricity spot 
market”, Journal of Political Economy, 100, 929-53. 
 
Littlechild, S (2005) Beyond Regulation, Institute of Economic Affairs. 
 
Meade, R. and S. O‟ Connor (2009) „Comparison of long-term contracts and vertical 
integration in decentralised electricity markets‟ Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced 
Studies, European University Institute, working paper No.2009-16 
 
OFGEM (2002) New electricity trading arrangements (NETA)- One year review. 
 
OFGEM (2007) OFGEM Annual Report 2006-2007. 
 
 23 
OFGEM (2008) Energy Supply Probe. Initial Findings Report, September 
 
Sweeting, A (2007) “Market power in the England and Wales wholesale electricity 
market 1995-2000”, Economic Journal, 117, 654-685. 
 
Wolfram, C D (1999) “Measuring duopoly power in the British electricity spot 
market”, American Economic Review, 89, 805-826. 
 24 
Figures and Tables 
 
 
Figure 1: Month-ahead wholesale electricity prices (Platts Data) and medium 
consumption retail prices (in pence for 3300 kWh) 
 
Figure 2: Calendar spreads example: this graph relates to the spread between UKPX 
and Platts‟ day-ahead assessments.  
Table 1: Dickey-Fuller test on spreads.  
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a) Calendar spreads against day-ahead prices. All series except month-year and 
2seasons-year show stationarity at the 1% level. 
  
no constant  
no trend constant 
constant  
and trend 
Day/week -24.461 -24.503 -24.500 
Week/month -11.289 -11.377 -11.461 
Day/month -15.891 -15.897 -15.920 
Day/2seasons -13.279 -14.095 -15.028 
Day/year -12.256 -12.727 -13.158 
Week/2seasons -7.874 -8.929 -10.212 
Week/year -6.770 -7.297 -7.768 
Month/2seasons -3.637 -4.270 -5.006 
Month/year -2.754 -3.059 -3.343 
2seasons/year -3.561 -3.571 -3.563 
 
(b) Calendar spreads, Platts‟ forward prices against UK Power Exchange prices. All 
series reject the hypothesis of random walk at the 1% level 
  
no constant  
no trend constant 
constant  
and trend 
UKPX/ day -31.69 -32.19 -32.26 
UKPX/week -27.94 -28 -28.01 
UKPX/month -18.98 -19.12 -19.19 
UKPX/2seasons -16.09 -17.64 -19.17 
UKPX/year -15.34 -16.36 -17.13 
 
 
Table 2: Mean differences between various maturities of wholesale prices based on 
relative (shifted) spreads. Mean value test. Null hypothesis: mean is zero 
series mean t-test p-value lower.value upper.value 
apx-d.ahead 0.0376 7.5709 0.0000 0.0279 0.0474 
apx-
w.ahead 0.0485 7.8948 0.0000 0.0365 0.0606 
apx-
m.ahead 0.0836 12.3976 0.0000 0.0704 0.0968 
apx-
2s.ahead 0.1693 14.9642 0.0000 0.1471 0.1915 
apx-y.ahead 0.0971 7.0482 0.0000 0.0701 0.1242 
  
Table 3: Spark spreads (in relative terms), before and after NETA (but before 
BETTA) 
 statistic p.value mean period 1 mean period 2 
BN-BB_Rel. 
spreads 13.9671 0 0.4382 0.2422 
BN-BB_Abs. 
spreads 13.6238 0 9.7637 4.8603 
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Table 4: Selected relative retail margins [(retail price-wholesale costs)/retail price] as 
defined in the text. Null hypothesis: means are equal. 
  Relative 
spreads 
(margin) 
t-stat p- value mean 
period1 
mean 
period2 
Difference in 
differences 
t-stat p-value 
ALL Engl & Wal -12.31 0.00 0.46 0.51 
4.01 0.00 
  Scotland -7.64 0.00 0.44 0.47 
DD_inc Engl & Wal -19.99 0.00 0.46 0.53 
5.85 0.00 
  Scotland -13.79 0.00 0.45 0.5 
PPM inc Engl & Wal -18.66 0.00 0.51 0.57 
4.20 0.00 
  Scotland -14.26 0.00 0.48 0.53 
DD noninc Engl & Wal -12.89 0.00 0.43 0.48 
4.73 0.00 
  Scotland -7.25 0.00 0.43 0.46 
PPM noninc Engl & Wal -8.49 0.00 0.53 0.56 
7.26 0.00 
  Scotland 1.76 0.08 0.52 0.51 
Period 1 is the period after introduction of domestic retail competition but before NETA, period 2 is the 
period between the introduction of NETA and the introduction of BETTA. 
 
Table 4a: Selected relative retail margins [(retail price-wholesale costs)/retail price] as 
defined in the text. Null hypothesis: means are equal. 
  Relative 
spreads 
(margin) 
t-stat p- value mean 
period1 
mean 
period2 
Difference in 
differences 
t-stat p-value 
ALL Engl & Wal -11.02 0.00 0.46 0.51 
3.68 0.00 
  Scotland -6.66 0.00 0.44 0.47 
DD_inc Engl & Wal -18.14 0.00 0.46 0.54 
5.85 0.00 
  Scotland -11.33 0.00 0.45 0.5 
PPM inc Engl & Wal -16.61 0.00 0.51 0.57 
3.95 0.00 
  Scotland -12.03 0.00 0.48 0.53 
DD noninc Engl & Wal -12.43 0.00 0.43 0.49 
4.76 0.00 
  Scotland -6.68 0.00 0.43 0.46 
PPM noninc Engl & Wal -6.00 0.00 0.53 0.56 
6.79 0.00 
  Scotland 3.49 0.01 0.52 0.51 
Period 1 is the period after introduction of domestic retail competition but before NETA, period 2 is the 
period between April 2002 (removal of all price controls and end of the consolidation periods) and the 
introduction of BETTA. 
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Table 5. Regression Analysis of determinants of retail price 
a) ENGLAND AND WALES- dependent variable, retail price for average 
consumption 
Bill type All DD_inc DD_Ninc PPM_inc PPM_Ninc 
(Intercept) 
 
12276.96 
*** 
14084.35 
*** 
18042.27 
*** 
11572.09 
*** 
21741.88 
** 
Distribn. cost -1.093 
** 
-1.437 
*** 
-1.271 
*** 
-1.033 
* 
-0.064 
 
wholesale_cost 0.527 
*** 
0.375 
*** 
0.306 
*** 
0.507 
*** 
0.323 
*** 
Neta dummy 1609.308 
** 
2315.309 
*** 
1884.071 
*** 
1481.903 
* 
-453.749 
 
Vertical Int. 8551.361 
*** 
9956.116 
*** 
8922.966 
*** 
8527.466 
** 
3001.426 
 
Amerada 
dummy 
-1484.15 
*** 
-1707.16 
*** 
-1452.49 
*** 
-2027.74 
*** 
205.109 
 
Basic power 
dummy 
1888.799 
** 
2162.99 
*** 
1860.111 
*** 
1791.585 
* 
186.681 
 
Energy supply 
dummy 
721.637 
** 
538.692 
** 
409.591 
* 
567.867 
 
236.862 
 
Indep. Energy 
dummy 
-461.754 
 
-1713.96 
*** 
-1777.17 
*** 
-996.509 
* 
-524.353 
 
Atlantic 
dummy 
1342.381 
 
1222.865 
 
923.317 
 
1031.443 
 
402.932 
 
            
wald.test 39.39 68.77 58.07 72.48 18.81 
p.value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 
b) SCOTLAND- dependent variable, retail price for average consumption 
 Bill type All DD_inc DD_Ninc PPM_inc PPM_Ninc 
(Intercept) 
 
22419 
*** 
24216 
*** 
22846 
*** 
23629 
*** 
27097 
*** 
Distribn. cost 0.38 
 
0.50 
 
0.30 
 
0.74 
** 
0.28 
 
wholesalecost 0.31 
*** 
0.09 
 
0.29 
*** 
-0.01 
 
0.18 
** 
Amerada 
dummy 
-718.5 
*** 
-374.9 
* 
-828.8 
*** 
-226.4 
 
682.3 
** 
Basic power 
dummy 
-291.0 
 
-48.6 
 
-277.7 
 
-30.7 
 
-1567.7 
*** 
Energy supply 
dummy 
677.487 
*** 
-335.79 
* 
421.97 
** 
116.435 
 
747.3 
*** 
Indep. Energy 
dummy 
-2018.9 
*** 
-1969.1 
*** 
-1668.4 
*** 
-147.4 
 
-125.5 
 
Atlantic  
dummy 
-1324.7 
*** 
-1128.2 
*** 
-1318.8 
*** 
88.8 
 
-750.9 
*** 
      
 28 
wald.test 56.395 60.929 75.537 1.3207 44.454 
p.value 6.74E-11 7.81E-12 7.19E-15 0.9328 1.87E-08 
 
*** p-value<0.01, ** 0.01<p-value<0.05, * 0.05-p-value<0.1 
Note_1: Wholesale cost is wholesale price (for the average consumer bill) 
instrumented by Brent Oil price lagged 6 months. 
Note_2: Vertical Int is measured as the ratio of the annual generating capacity owned 
by the top 6 energy companies to annual domestic sales, instrumented by the UK 
government 20-year bond yield, real terms, in percent. 
Note 3: All models have been estimated using GLS (Generalized Least Squares) 
estimators with AR(2) residuals, except for PPM_Ninc (non-incumbent tariffs for 
prepayment consumers) where residuals have been modelled with an AR(4) structure. 
This different structure of autocorrelation is needed to obtain residuals with no 
evidence of deterministic pattern. 
Note 4: The dummies for independent companies take on the value 1 when the firm is 
operating, 0 otherwise. 
Note 5: The Wald test relates to the null hypothesis that all four independents have a 
zero effect on prices, the alternative being that they do affect prices. 
 
 
Table 6: Selected relative whole retail margins [(retail price-wholesale gas costs-
distribution charges)/retail price] 
  
Retail spreads  
to gas t stat p value 
mean 
period1 
mean 
period2 
ALL England  -1.0752 0.2825 0.5681 0.5714 
  Scotland   6.0181 0 0.546 0.5264 
Periods 1 and 2 as defined in table 4. 
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Appendix:  
Links between wholesale prices for power and input fuels 
 
We first examine dynamic patterns specific to the UK day-ahead base load power 
prices, i.e. (i) whether wholesale power prices are autocorrelated, and if so how, and 
(ii) evaluate their relationship over time with related energy products such as natural 
gas, gas oil, fuel oil and coal, i.e. whether wholesale power prices depend on other 
energy prices and if so the strength of that dependence.  
 
An initial graphical inspection of the time series in levels reveals a time trend for all 
the series which indicates a lack of statistical stationarity.  For this reason the 
statistical analysis of relationships between energy prices below was conducted for 
the most part in terms of returns (differences in the logarithms of prices between one 
time period and the next). This approach is not only statistically appropriate but it also 
allows us to examine the returns to holding the commodity in question for one more 
period as measured by the log difference of the price today and the price yesterday. 
Figure A1 illustrates the data series for prices for power (wholesale electricity) and 
figure A2 converts this into returns. 
 
The graphical analysis of the prices (in levels) reveals the presence of step changes in 
the price levels of gas oil and heavy fuel oil in late 2004 and a series of extreme 
values at the end of 2005 and beginning of 2006 for both gas and electricity. Figure 
A1 illustrates. 
 
The statistical analysis of autocorrelation in the returns observed with daily frequency 
reveals a pattern of seasonal non-stationarity in the power series, which is not seen in 
the data for any other energy price observed with the same frequency. An example is 
shown in figure A3. This pattern implies that there is a strong positive correlation 
between the returns today and the returns on the same day last week, the week before 
that etc.
22
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 In making comparisons for cross correlation purposes between power and other price series it is 
important to take account of the different frequency. However when the autocorrelation function is 
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Extending the analysis of the daily time series to the potential correlation across the 
returns for different energy products, we observe a statistically significant 
contemporaneous correlation between the two final products (gas and power) and also 
between heavy fuel oil and gas oil, but none between these two groups, as can be seen 
in table A1. There is also a much smaller positive correlation between returns on gas 
yesterday and returns on power today and some negative correlation between gas on 
earlier days in the week and power today. Figure A4 illustrates this cross-correlation, 
with the lag length on the horizontal axis and correlations represented on the vertical. 
Essentially correlations outside the dashed lines may be considered as statistically 
significant at the 95% level.  The other cross correlations, apart from the 
contemporaneous correlation between gas oil and heavy fuel oil, do not exhibit a 
similar pattern.  
 
The observed contemporaneous and lagged relationship between gas and power is to 
be expected since gas and power are to some extent substitutes in production and 
consumption- they are likely to be influenced by the same shocks and a rise in returns 
on gas will be followed by an effect on electricity prices. On the other hand the 
relationship between heavy fuel and gas oil could be explained in terms of the 
products substitutability in an earlier stage of the energy production process, or 
shocks to the production or supply of oil. We also observe a statistically significant 
but small correlation between power and heavy fuel oil. This contemporaneous effect 
between an input and an output of the energy production process is not observed 
between the same series when examined at lower frequency.   
 
The statistical analysis of the same sets of time series observed at weekly frequency 
allows us to make comparisons additionally with coal prices.  Table 2 shows the 
contemporaneous correlations.  However it does not provide as much evidence about 
the autocorrelation and cross-correlation patterns as for the daily data. Indeed the 
analysis of the series with weekly frequency reveals only a significant negative 
correlation between this week‟s returns and last week‟s for both power and gas.  
                                                                                                                                            
calculated for gas and power over a period of 5 working days only, the same non-stationary weekly 
pattern is still observed for the power data.  
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As with the daily price series we still find strong statistically significant evidence of a 
contemporaneous cross-correlation between returns on gas and power and between 
heavy fuel oil and gas oil, but no significant link between power and other fuel prices. 
We also observe some smaller and negative correlation between power and gas at 
various other weekly intervals. This again should reflect the substitutability between 
these two energy products. Notice that although we observe a price influence both 
from power to gas and from gas to power the relative sizes of these effects seem to 
indicate an overall positive effect of gas price variations on power.  Finally, there was 
a slight positive link between coal price and power price around 11 weeks thereafter.  
This might indicate a relationship between the two, since the coal price is a 90 day 
forward price, or it might just be a rogue result. 
 
These results enable us to draw a few conclusions regarding relationships between the 
variables.  First, once we examine returns rather than raw prices, comparatively little 
evidence of persistence across time in shocks is observed.  Second, there is a clear 
link between gas prices and power prices based on the series used here, with almost 
no lag in the relationship.  But third, there is no evidence of a link between the other 
fuels examined and power prices.  Thus, as a rather negative result, there is rather 
little in the price series for other fuels that can be used to predict pricing patterns for 
wholesale electrical power.  From our analysis it appears that daily prices are more 
informative than weekly aggregates. Also, as far as market volatility is concerned, it 
appears that uncertainty in the market emerges with a 4-month periodicity. A possible 
explanation of these observed patterns might be found in the interaction between 
contract-based trade in energy product and trade taking place within the wholesale 
market as a result of the institutional changes brought about by the introduction of 
NETA. 
 32 
_ 
Figures A1 and A2: Graphs showing prices (pt) and returns, respectively, for the 
higher of the two electricity price indices on a daily basis. Returns defined as 
_
 
 
 
Figure A3: Showing daily autocorrelation patterns for power prices. Let the lag be 
called k (periods). The dashed error bars represent the 95
th
 percentile region. 
 
 33 
 
Figure A4: Cross correlations on a daily basis.  The vertical axis and error bars are as 
in figure A3.  The horizontal axis relates to lags in the cross-correlation that can be 
positive or negative between the two variables listed.  Thus where the lag is zero, the 
bar refers to the zero order correlation as listed in table A1.  Where the lag is one unit 
positive, for example the bar immediately to the right of zero, this is the correlation 
between the return on gas “today” and the return on electricity “tomorrow”, which in 
this case is positive and significant.  
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Table A1: Correlation matrix for electricity, gas, fuel and gas oil prices variations 
(daily prices). p-values are in brackets.  
  electricity gas fuel gas oil 
electricity 1 
0.304 
(0.000) 
0.081 
(0.002) 
0.035 
(0.172) 
gas 
0.304 
(0.000) 1 
0.007 
(0.776) 
0.026 
(0.302) 
fuel 
0.081 
(0.002) 
0.007 
(0.776) 1 
0.639 
(0.000) 
gas oil 
0.035 
(0.172) 
0.026 
(0.302) 
0.639 
(0.000) 1 
 
Table A2: This table is the equivalent of table A1 but with a weekly frequency in 
order to include coal price data. 
  electricity gas fuel gas oil coal 
electricity 1 
0.534 
(0.000) 
0.059 
(0.297) 
0.035 
(0.537) 
-0.015 
(0.797) 
gas 
0.534 
(0.000) 1 
-0.036 
(0.530) 
-0.011 
(0.850) 
0.014 
(0.809) 
fuel 
0.059 
(0.297) 
-0.036 
(0.530) 1 
0.652 
(0.000) 
-0.041 
(0.473) 
gas oil 
0.035 
(0.537) 
-0.011 
(0.850) 
0.652 
(0.000) 1 
-0.003 
(0.958) 
coal 
-0.015 
(0.797) 
0.014 
(0.809) 
-0.041 
(0.473) 
-0.003 
(0.958) 1 
 
